In a cooperative transferable utilities game, the allocation of the win of the grand coalition is an Egalitarian Allocation, if this win is divided into equal parts among all players. The Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value of a game is a set of games in which the Shapley Value is the same as the initial one. In the Inverse Set, we determined a family of games for which the Shapley Value is also a coalitional rational value. The Egalitarian Allocation of the game is efficient, so that in the set called the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, the allocation is the same as the initial one, but may not be coalitional rational. In this paper, we shall find out in the same family of the Inverse Set, a subfamily of games with the Egalitarian Allocation is also a coalitional rational value. We show some relationship between the two sets of games, where our values are coalitional rational. Finally, we shall discuss the possibility that our procedure may be used for solving a very similar problem for other efficient values. Numerical examples show the procedure to get solutions for the efficient values.
Introduction
A cooperative transferable utilities game (TU game), is a pair ( ) 
As the values are efficient, they satisfy the last condition (3), but it is very easy to choose a game with an empty Core, to get both values, (1) and (2), not satisfying the inequalities (3). For example, for the game ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
one computes the two values, by using (1) and (2), to get ( ) ( ) 1 1 1  1 1 1  ,  , , ,  ,  , , ,  3 3 3  3 3 
and it is easy to verify that our conditions (3) for all coalitions with two players, do not hold. The same situation may occur even in the case when the game is not a constant sum game. For example, in the game
we can compute the two efficient values, to get ( ) ( ) ( ) 25 25 25 , 9,9, 7 , , , , ,
and the inequalities (3) do not hold. We shall see later the difference between these two games. Of course, this means that in both cases there is a small chance that the grand coalition will be formed, taking into account that the coalitions with two players give some better wins.
In an earlier work, (see [1] Hart and A. Mas-Collel, (see [2] ). In a more recent work, (see [3] ), we intro- 
Egalitarian Allocations for Three Person Games
We shall start by considering Egalitarian Allocations for three person cooperative TU games, in order to give a motivation for our work and to give the basic ideas about the procedure of solving the general problem, for any number of players, as stated in the previous section. we use the equalities implied by the results, in (10) we can eliminate three constants associated to the coalitions of size two, to get an explicit formula for the Inverse Set, relative to a Shapley Value (see [1] ):
As shown in another previous work, (see [3] ), a solution for the last problem stated above will be found in what we called the family of almost null games of 
For three person games, this may be rewritten in scalar form as
The last formula may be used to write the solution, as soon as the value of the parameter 123 c is chosen. This can be done such that the new game, which has the same Shapley Value, has the value in the Core, that is in the new game the value is Coalitional Rational (see [3] ).
Let us go to Egalitarian Allocations: as seen in (13) 
Indeed, the Formula (14) can be used to obtain
where we used (14) and we may use (13). Thus, the inequalities (15) are the coa- a) The Shapley Value will be coalitional rational, if the parameter satisfies
b) The Egalitarian Allocation will be coalitional rational, if the same parameter satisfies a condition (18), to be derived from (13) and (14).
Proof: Denote ( ) , M EA N v = , and by using (13), rewrite (14) as ( )
Hence, to get both values discussed above as coalitional rational values in the these numbers α and β are given by (16) and (17), above.
From (16) and (17), notice that ( ) 
Of course, in both cases we have infinite sets of games, solutions for our problem stated above. To summarize, before going to the general case, the procedure had the following steps: write the equations of the games in the almost null family of the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value, by using a general potential basis, and derive for both values, the conditions for the appurtenance to the Core of the game. Choose a value of the parameter, satisfying both conditions and by using (13), derive the new game, a corresponding solution. The general case will be discussed in the next section, where we use the steps described above. Of course, a big role will have the formulas (8), (9), and (12).
Egalitarian Allocations and Coalitional Rationality
As explained in the previous section, the set of all TU games with the same Shapley Value, called the Inverse Set, relative to this value, is the set of games given by a formula similar to (10), where the basis of this vector space is given by Formula (8). If we consider the general case of n person TU games, then a basis is defined by (8), (see [3] ). The family of almost null games in the Inverse Set is obtained by taking equal to zero all the coefficients associated to coalitions , 2 S n S n ⊂ ≤ − . In other words, this family is given by Formula (11), however now the basic vectors are different, so that this formula can be rewritten in scalar form as:
Of course, for 3 n = we obtain Formula (13). As shown in [3] , in this family a game has the Shapley Value coalitional rational, if the parameter N c satisfies the inequality Now, the inequalities (15), taking into account the Formula (21) become
hence the coalitional rationality conditions for the Egalitarian Allocation can be written as 1 .
Here again for 3 n = we get the condition (17). Now, from (22) and (24), a few algebraic operations give the inequality
which proves the main result of the paper: 
We can easily check that the two values are unchanged and they are coalitional rational in the new game (31).
Discussions and Remarks
In this work we connected a value, the Egalitarian Allocation, to the Inverse Problem, relative to the Shapley Value, with coalitional rationality. There have been several interesting facts, due mainly to the fact that the new value is efficient. Moreover, we have been able to choose the game in the Inverse Set such that both values have both the property of coalitional rationality. We intend to apply the same procedure to another efficient value, a third value, and try to do the same connection with the Shapley Value, consider the value defined by ( ) As seen in the formula, this is also an efficient value, so that the efficiency is kept when we go from the given game to the games in the family of almost null games of the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value. By using Formula (32), we compute the new value for the above given game (6); we obtain , from formulas (35) we obtain the game (20). We can easily check that surprisingly, for this new game, the three values are unchanged and they are coalitional rational. Hence, the procedure which has been used for the value of Egalitarian Allocation, works for other efficient values. Now, briefly summarizing, we tried to solve our problem for an efficient value, by using our new idea: we are looking for a solution of any efficient value, in the family of the almost null game of the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value. One more idea is that the last example from this section may still be further developed for the general case of games with any number of players. It is not sure that in this case the value for the solution game in the almost null family is the same as the one for the original game. This was proved here to be true for Egalitarian Allocation, like for the Shapley Value, but it may not be true in general.
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